Japan Railway & Transport Review No. 21 (pp.10–13)
Feature: Transition to Market Economy |
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In 1989, many countries in central and eastern Europe, including Hungary, were faced with the complex task of reforming their centrally planned societies into market-driver economies. The task has been made more complex by the fact that these countries simultaneously had to modernize and stabilize their economies and societies. The old centrally planned system meant that these countries were not integrated into the world economy in a balanced manner and had deprived them of the tremendous advantages of international division of labour and cooperation.
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Representative Reforms of Hungarian Transport Sector |
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The Hungarian macroeconomic indicators show that the country's investments, exports, imports, and private and public consumption are increasing significantly over the last few years. |
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Reasons for Declining Railway Passenger and Freight Traffic |
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All the central and eastern European (CEE) railways, including the Hungarian State Railways (MÁV), experienced sharp drops in passenger transport. The main reason was the bankruptcy of the large state-owned enterprises, as well as a sudden increase in ownership of private cars. |
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Figure 1: Trans European Network |
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Future Trends of CEE Railways |
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Quite clearly, as the CEE countries transition to market economies, structural changes in their economies and foreign trade, coupled with increased cost sensitivity and some transition side effects will result in declining demand for freight transport. The development of telecommunications and information technology is expected to have a similar impact on transport in general. In most CEE countries, freight transport volumes by 2000 will still be much lower than in 1990, although some growth from 2000 to 2010 will probably bring freight volumes back to near the 1990 level, but they are unlikely to be larger. |
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Railway Financing Problems |
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The distorted financing of CEE railways inherited from the old planned economies has caused many problems typified by the example of MÁV. Until 1982, ticket revenues plus government subsidies exceeded the costs of passenger transport. However, the increasing gap between revenues (including subsidies) and costs since 1983 meant that MÁV was forced to cross-finance passenger services from freight profits. It also meant that freight customers were financing social policy. This cut into the freight competitiveness and diverted resources from new investment and essential maintenance, resulting in deteriorating infrastructure and rolling stock. |
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Restructuring Measures |
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The first need was to make the railways more competitive and market oriented. A number of EU directives concerning railways proposed the following measures:
Based on these recommendations, MÁV and the railways in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, have made some progress in liberalization, deregulation and privatization. The MÁV management recognized the need to increase its knowledge of the transport market and has made greater use of market research techniques and marketing methods. Special marketing divisions have been established at the most important network nodes. The number of MÁV employees has dropped by 33% compared to 1989 and unprofitable assets, such as marshalling yards and rolling stock were sold off. Since 1992, non-railway activities like freight forwarding, wagon and carriage repair, building and track construction, printing, and track-side landscaping, have been spun off. As a result, on 31 December 1996, MÁV was the sole shareholder of 55 companies, the major shareholder in 8 companies, and a minor shareholder in 41 companies. MÁV is continuing to spin off non-railway units, and is contracting out non-railway services in passenger operations and freight transport. The major steps in the restructuring and changes in the relationship between the government and MÁV were as follows:
These decisions tried to take into account the best practices of railway restructuring, as well as the EU regulations, including EU Directive 91/440 EEC, 95/18 EEC, and 95/19 EEC on equal access to railway networks for all qualified third-party operators, licensing of railway operators, and allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and charging of infrastructure fees, respectively. MÁV's restructuring has not fully implemented the main guidelines of EU Directive 91/440 EEC—the requirements for autonomous management and separation of infrastructure from operations have been almost fully achieved, but old debts have only been partially written off, and open access to infrastructure has not been implemented yet. The establishment of MÁV and the conclusion of the contract with the government was a significant step towards independent management, but to ensure genuine management autonomy, it was necessary to establish a clear distinction between PSOs and commercial services. Although the process of creating a fully autonomous management has already started, the government still regulates domestic freight tariffs (to be liberalizem°9n the near future) and all domestic passenger fares. However, MÁV can offer special business discounts and these are used widely in freight transport. The management autonomy is partly restricted by the government's responsibility to improve the railway infrastructure and to act as the guarantor for large loans. This means, it may make investment decisions based on political rather than economic considerations. For example, the government has given high priority to constructing a costly (but uneconomic) new railway link with Slovenia, and to electrification of three other lines. A concession basis has been chosen for the electrification, which will permit more reliable and economic train operations, but it will be much more expensive than direct financing from the state budget. The resultant shortage of funds has resulted in the postponement of the urgently needed rehabilitation of core infrastructure and rolling stock. Separation of infrastructure from operation has already been achieved. The 1993 Railway Act provides for separation of accounts while the separation of assets, expenditure, and revenues as well as accounting rules are defined by the 1996 joint decree of the Minister of Transport and the Minister of Finance. The infrastructure organization, which consists of the Directorate for Track, Bridges and Buildings and the Directorate for Signalling, Telecommunication and Power Supply, has been entirely separate from the commercial operations since 1 January 1996. |
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Photo: Rebuilt V43 electric locomotive at Szolnok Station |
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MÁV 1999-2007 Development and Rehabilitation Programme |
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At present, the MÁV technical standards only partly satisfy the general operation and safety requirements for advanced European railways and the expected service levels for national passenger and freight transport. This is due to insufficient investment and maintenance over the past decade as a result of shortage of funds. The long-term lack of reconstruction and maintenance means that the original technical standards can no longer be restored or preserved in many sections. |
Katalin Tánczos Dr Tánczos is Professor and Head of the Department of Transport Economics at the Technical University of Budapest, where she has worked since obtaining a PhD in 1975. She was a Japan International Cooperation Agency visiting scholar in 1990 and obtained an MBA in 1991 from Heriot Watt University in Edinburgh. She has published widely on CEE transport issues and was a regional editor for International Railway Journal until 1998. |