Japan Railway & Transport Review No. 8 (pp.27–30)
Feature: Restructuring Railways (part 2) |
First, a reminder why the railroad reform occurred at the end of 1993. The situation was characterized by decades of inactivity in the field of rail transport policy, by overcrowded roads and air traffic routes, by unbearable environmental impairment, by impossible-to-handle predicted future traffic increases, and finally by the catastrophic financial situation of the state railroads with a DM16 billion deficit and DM67 billion accumulated debts in 1993. Figure 1 shows how the yearly deficits would have grown from 1994 without reform. |
Figure 1: German Railways Without Reform (Results in DM1 billion) |
The Reform |
The most important reform targets of the Federal government were better use of rail capacity and reduction of the burden on taxpayers. Calculation had shown that reform would reduce the load on the Federal budget by more than DM100 billion within 10 years. Table 1 shows how these savings were to be obtained. |
Table 1: Expected Financial Consequences of Reform |
Development since 1994 |
In Germany, we differentiate between external and internal reform. External reform is the reshaping of the relationship between railroad and State. This has been fully realized—as intended—by legislation on 1 January 1994. The State is only the ordinary owner of the DB AG enterprise, and unlike in the past, can now influence the business only within the narrower limits of corporation law and general industrial regulation, to which all other private enterprises are subjected. |
Third Party Access to Infrastructure |
DB AG still has the right to manage the rail infrastructure, but, under certain conditions, it must grant third parties access without discrimination and under control of a neutral authority. It may not give privileges in regard to allocating train paths to its own business sectors for goods traffic and passenger traffic. It has lost the rail monopoly. New third parties and DB AG's own business sectors pay a usage fee. |
The International Dimension |
Perhaps the most important aspect of third parties' access to rail infrastructure is the possibility to expand the business of railways with the aid of developing European law across Europe and to shake off national territorial restrictions. Until now, in international transport, the railway was the only transportation mode in which businesses were unable to cross borders. However, in the future they will have a chance to serve their customers across borders making it no longer necessary to depend on a foreign business partner—another railway. |
Pricing System for Infrastructure |
DB AG has introduced a price system for using the rail infrastructure. It is not based on average cost for the entire network, but instead, is based on prices per train kilometer on the different line sectors. There are 10 line types and 12 train categories, resulting in a considerable number of different fee combinations. Although the number of third-party users—about 30 in 1994—remains limited at present, business with them increased from DM25 million in 1994 to DM40 million in 1995. Transactions of DM70 million to DM100 million are expected in 1996. |
Internal Reform |
However, internal reform is much more important for DB AG's survival than the above-mentioned external reform. Here, the enterprise—the management and employees—shapes its own future. It will no longer be possible to claim omissions and political mistakes to the same extent as before, and the enterprise will take responsibility for itself. |
Organizational Measures |
The business sectors are now strictly separated within DB AG. By late 1998, they will change into separate stock corporations as daughters of DB AG Holding (Fig. 2). Already , cross subsidization is no longer possible. Quasi-profit-and-loss-accounts for each business sector lead to full accountability. Decisions can be made more accurately on the basis of clear successes and failures. |
Figure 2: Separation of Infrastructure Division from Railway Operations |
Entrepreneurial Decisions |
In business, investment is concentrated in areas with long-term commercial prospects. Finally, DB AG can start catching up with the technological backlog in comparison to the other modes of transport. In this respect, it exerts considerable pressure on the supply industry, which, based on laws from Brussels, is in competition all across Europe. |
Table 2: Staff Development DB/DR and DB AG (Number at year end without trainees) |
Employee Training and Motivation |
As a service enterprise, DB AG depends on its employees being efficient and motivated. It was and is not easy to make civil servants, who swore to serve the welfare of the Federal Republic of Germany, quickly become employees fighting for economic survival, cost cutting, and profit making. In preparation for the foundation of the stock corporation, DB and DR have made considerable investment available for training and retraining personnel. Approximately 100,000 employees were trained and prepared for the new challenges. The concept that the customer really must be at the centre is simple, but it is not easily carried out. It requires a basic change in the attitude of each employee. The fact that this is not possible from one day to the next, but is a process requiring time, is an important lesson learned. Preventing the customer from feeling the difficulties as little as possible is a large challenge confronting DB AG. |
First Results of Reform |
The first results have confirmed the opinions of those who courageously pushed through the rail reform in Germany. The first two business years closed with pre-tax profits of DM90 million and about DM280 million. Planned cost reductions, a considerable increase in productivity by cuts in personnel expenses, accompanied by extensive investments, and increase in turnover, provide justifiable grounds for optimism. Compared to before the reform, full use of negotiation margins is now possible in the field of purchasing and the entry into strategic alliances with private partners and their capital participation, as well as aggressive marketing of train paths for third-party users are outstanding examples of business development. |
Table 3: DB AG Investment Programme 1996 to 2000 |
Outlook |
The railroad reform in Germany is not purely a national invention. Various concepts from reforms in other countries—especially Japan and Sweden—were considered. This reform is also certainly no miracle cure. However, it is a serious effort to provide DB AG with a meaningful future in the interest of the public and market participants. It would not be sensible to simply transplant the German reform to other countries. Each government must find a solution specific to its country and the historic and institutional situation. However, the development in Germany is worth critical and careful observation. |
Photo: Cologne Central Station |
Peter Häfner Dr Peter Häfner undertook postgraduate studies at the University of Kansas in the USA on a Fulbright scholarship. He worked for the German Federal Railroad (DB) from 1967 to 1995 in various departments including the International Tariff Department and Freight Marketing Department. He was DB representative in Paris from 1974 to 1978, and Director of International Relations from 1979 to 1995. |